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MENTAL CAPACITY AND MEDICATION: A LATENT LEGAL PROBLEM
The propensity of people to put off making their wills is a trait well-
known to lawyers. A few days in the hospital often act as a powerful
stimulus to testamentary activity, however, and it is chiefly with the
medication which people receive in hospitals that this discussion is
concerned.
Few people outside the medical profession appreciate the extent of
mental impairment caused by certain medications prescribed for physical
illnesses,' and therefore mental capacity in relation to medication is
called a latent legal problem. In addition to the well-known effects of
narcotic drugs upon the mind of man, medical research is currently dis-
closing that many of the wonder-drugs possess mental side-effects,
ranging from sleepiness to psychoses; and it is to be expected that
attorneys for caveators will soon, discover and employ the results of
these medical findings in attacking wills executed by testators under the
influence of mind-affecting drugs.
This discussion seeks to alert attorneys to the drugs most likely
to cause mental impairment, to acquaint them with the results of law-
suits in which testamentary capacity has been litigated against a back-
ground of drug-induced impairment, and to suggest some problems
and precautions to be considered in drawing a will under these cir-
cumstances.
II
MENTAL SIDE-EFFECTS OF THERAPEUTIC DRUGS
Certain substances used in treating physical illness produce psycho-
logical changes in patients which are called "mental side-effects": that
is, the primary effect of the medication is something other than impair-
ing the patient's thought processes. For example, morphine primarily
deadens the pain of a heart attack, but at the same time it secondarily
impairs the patient's ability to think. Neither the medical nor the legal
*Assistant Director, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, 1955-56.
'Physicians are aware of the problem, however. See letter at 156 JOURNAL
OF THE AmmICAx MEDICAL AssoclrATIox 1546 (1954), asking the editor whether
giving a cancer patient 2 grains of codeine daily would affect his capacity to make
a will. The editor answered No.
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profession can overlook mental side-effects, which are none the less real
for being ancillary.
Precisely because the concern of this discussion is with side-effects,
a large number of mental impairments will not be taken up at all. Long-
standing mental derangements, whether caused by malfunction of the
brain, by toxic conditions in the body, by damage to brain tissue and
blood vessels, or by congenital deficiencies, are not considered.2 None
of these are mental side-effects so much as they are primarily results of a
condition of the brain itself. Furthermore, as a practical matter, these
mental conditions are less likely to escape the attention of attorneys than
are the mental side-effects of medication.
Therapeutic Drugs3
The layman in medical matters often uses the term "drugs" to refer
to the narcotics used by addicts, but the term used here, "therapeutic
drugs," is broader in meaning and more specific in application. It
refers to all substances used in the treatment of disease, including nar-
cotics when used medicinally, and comprehending a vast array of other
healing substances employed by the medical sciences. It excludes drugs
such as heroin, marijuana, and mescaline, which are not ordinarily ad-
ministered for therapeutic purposes.
Pain and Pain Relief
Much of the medical literature dealing with the mental side-effects
of therapeutic drugs, and almost all of the case law dealing with the
impact of mental side-effects upon testamentary capacity, arises out of
the pain-killing drugs, known technically as "analgesics."
Pain is a mental reaction. Pain relief can be achieved through
three general approaches: local relief by means of anesthetics like pro-
Caine and ethyl chloride, which deaden nerves in the affected parts so
that pain signals are not transmitted; intermediate anesthetic techniques
like spinal anesthesia, which block off nerve impulses en route to the
brain; and central pain relief-that is, suppressing the pain-registering
function of the brain itself. It is with the pain-killers which act cen-
trally upon the brain that this discussion is concerned.
Centrally-acting pain-relievers have three principal effects upon the
responses of persons suffering pain: (1) they raise the threshold of
pain perception-the primary effect; and as side-effects, (2) they remove
2 For a brief survey of the effects of all types of illnesses upon testamentary
capacity, see Note, Disease as Evidence of Lack of Testamentary Capacity oil
Undue Influence, 2 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR AI-roRNEYS 15 (1955).
'The bulk of the general description of drugs and their actions in the pages
which follow can be found in any textbook on pharmacology. Extensive use has
been made in this discussion of GOODMAN AND GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL
BASIs OF THERAPEUTICS (2d ed. 1955). It is cited only where especially apt or
directly quoted.
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the usual responses to pain-anxiety, fear, panic, withdrawal, flight; and
(3) they induce sleep, which itself raises the pain threshold about 50%.
4
Morphine and Similar Drugs
The most important centrally-acting pain-relievers are the narcotics
derived from opium, together with synthetic narcotics which resemble
them: morphine, codeine, Dilaudid, Demerol, methadone, and many
others.5
Drugs of the morphine family may be administered orally, hypo-
dermically, or rectally. Intravenous injection is the most rapid route,
producing peak analgesia within 20 minutes. Subcutaneous injections
are slower, requiring as much as an hour or more with morphine and
Dilaudid.0 The usual dosage varies with different drugs and com-
pounds, biut a 15 milligram (4 grain) injection of morphine sulphate is
normally all the morphine given at one time. The usual interval be-
tween doses is three to four hours, but for severe pain the interval is
shortened.
The mental side-effects of narcotics, unfortunately for anyone wishing
to suspend them temporarily without unduly tormenting the patient, ap-
pear to outlast the analgesic effect:
"The pain threshold-raising action was not closely related in
time to these psychological changes, the latter effects outlasting the
threshold-raising action by many hours.'
'7
Several other medical terms applicable to many drugs are introduced
here in connection with the morphine family. With persons who have
developed "tolerance" to the effects of a drug from administration over
a period of two weeks or so, a larger dose or a more potent drug is re-
quired to control a given intensity of pain. Partly because of toler-
ance, a physician always prescribes the least potent analgesic capable of
relieving pain, saving the narcotics for the most severe pain. When
'Wolff, Hardy, Goodell, Studies on Pain, 19 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL INVESTI-
GATION 659 (1940).
'This is the first encounter with the problem of trade names for drugs. Every
drug has a scientific name which describes its chemical composition, a name not in
common use. Most drugs are also given medical short titles, which may or may
not come to be the most common name for the drug, because every pharmaceutical
manufacturer also trade names his version of the preparation, and his trade name
may be the one that sticks. In this discussion, trade names will be capitalized and
used if they are more meaningful to the layman than the medical name. Thus,
dihydromorphinone is referred to above as Dilaudid and meperidine as Demerol,
but methadone is a medical name in fairly common use-though the attorney may
encounter its trade name, Dolophine. Another profession's jargon is never easy
for the layman.
Seevers and Pfeiffer, Study of Analgesia, Subjective Depression, and Eu-
phoria Produced by Morphine, Ieroine, Dilaudid and Codeine in the Normat
Human Subject, 56 JOURNAL OF PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERI MENTAL TnERA-
pEuTics 166 (1936).
' Hardy, Wolff, Goodell, Pain Sensations and Reactions 344 (1952).
[Vol. 35
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pain is expected to continue and increase, as with incurable cancer, the
physician will first prescribe aspirin, then codeine, and finally morphine.
As tolerance develops, the patient must be given increasing doses of
morphine to control his pain; but tolerance to pain relief is accompanied
by tolerance to mental side-effects, a fact demonstrated by the ever-
increasing quantities of narcotics required by addicts in order to produce
the desired level of mental effect.8
When pain is especially severe, as in coronary thrombosis, physicians
sometimes administer two or three times the normal number of doses of
morphine in order to obtain pain relief. Such a quantity of morphine
in a normal individual would probably produce unconsciousness and
possibly death from respiratory failure; but a man with a heart attack
appears to be alert and wide awake, because his acute pain has given
him a high "level of reflect excitability."
"The more severe the pain, the larger is the dose of opiate
required and the greater the amount of drug that can be tol-
erated. . . . This is in keeping with the general principle that
the degree of stupefaction caused by a given amount of a de-
pressant drug is directly proportional to the level of reflex ex-
citability of the nervous system."' 0
Hence, a large quantity of drugs administered is not in itself conclusive
proof of mental impairment. The primary consideration is the observed
mental condition of the patient.
Various organs, notably the kidneys and liver, perform detoxifying
operations upon drugs. When these organs are not operating properly,
it becomes difficult to predict the reaction to a drug with mental side-
effects. For example, if there is a stoppage of kidney function, morphine
is often administered to relieve the discomfort of a patient's last illness;
but a dose of morphine which normally would have no mental effects
may be delayed in detoxication and excretion to such an extent that its
effects persist, cumulating to some extent with repeated dosage. This
persistence tends to limit the improvement to be expected in the usual
ups and downs of patients suffering from degenerative diseases of the
kidneys and liver in particular.
Anxiety and Euphoria
Still by way of definition, against the background of the morphine
family, the terms "anxiety" and "euphoria" are presented as the core
of the latent medico-legal problem of therapeutic drugs' side-effects
upon mental capacity.
'Tolerance to mental side-effects was acknowledged in Miller v. Oestrich, 157
Pa. 264, 27 AtI. 742 (1893).
'GOODMAN AND GILMAN, Op. cit. supra note 3. at 248.
10 Ibid.
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"Anxiety" is a word whose commonplace connotations agree toler-
ably welf with the medical meaning. Anxiety is mental pain, a psycho-
logical condition. Anxiety often exists by itself, without any physical
cause; but anxiety also accompanies physical pain. Just as the primary
effect of centrally-acting pain-relievers is the suppression of, physical
pain, a significant psychological side-effect of the same drugs is the
reduction of anxiety. The parallel in effects goes further. A patient
given morphine for abdominal pain also forgets the pain of a boil on
his arm; and likewise, when the anxiety over pain is suppressed, anxiety
over other cares diminishes at the same time."
"Euphoria" is approximately the opposite of anxiety, in the sense
that euphoria represents a general feeling of well-being. It has been
known for centuries that opium produces a feeling of well-being in its
habitual users. Moderate amounts of morphine (up to 15 mg.) are said
to produce euphoria, drowsiness, loss of anxiety and inhibitions, "... . and
increased ease of discriminating and making decisions. There is in-
ability to concentrate, difficulty in mentation, apathy .... -"12 This state-
ment is typical'of the description of the mental side-effects of morphine
found in most textbooks; but current research casts doubt upon the wis-
dom of applying the generalization indiscriminately to normal persons
as well as addicts. For example, the addict experiences euphoria from
a 15 mg. dose of morphine, but a normal person feels discomfort,
ranging from an all-over unwell feeling to nausea and vomiting.
"The impressive reputation of the opiates as dangerous eu-
phoriants in normal persons seems largely based on the writings
and experiences of celebrated literary figures such as De Quincey,
Coleridge, Baudelaire, and Cocteau and on the unqualified transfer
of the results of studies on drug addicts ... to non-addicts. The
fact that many agents are capable of producing euphoria in ad-
dicts emphasizes the importance of the addict rather than the
drug."a
3
Thus a person under the influence of morphine for a heart attack might
be expected to react with discomfort to its side-effects; but a person in
terminal stages of cancer who had been given morphine steadily for a
matter of weeks would certainly be dependent upon it physically and
would probably be addicted to it and react with the addict's response.
Hardy, Wolff, Goodell, Pain Sensations and Reactions 326 et seq. (1952).
-2 GOODMAN AND GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
191 (1941). Notice that the quotation is from the first edition; the second edition
in 1955 is far less dogmatic.
"von Felsinger, Lasagna, Beecher, Drug-Induced Mood Changes in Man, 2.
Personality and Reactions to Drugs, 157 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 1113, 1117 (1955).
[Vol. 35
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The second observation is that the healthy individual's response to
drugs varies with his pre-drug state of mind.
".... [T]he usual effects of opiates (blunting of reactivity, re-
duction of urgency to action, interference with associational ac-
tivity, and lassitude) may constitute a pleasant relief and tem-
porary cessation of tension and struggle for the unbalanced per-
sonality. To the balanced personality these same effects may well
constitute a useless, confusing, unwanted, and unpleasant inter-
ference with normal functioning.'
4
These generalizations can only be of value when put to use in a
particular situation. It would seem reasonable to assume that if a
man's attention can be aroused and focused upon the problems of his
estate and maintained as long as need be, then a feeling of mild
euphoria is of little legal consequence.
But consider the euphoric testator's appraisal of his only son, who
sides with his mother in every dispute, as a proper object of his bounty;
and how can the testator resist the urgings of his niece Sally, who has
stood by him and comforted him, even if she did marry a Catholic? Who
gets the old home place and who gets the General Motors? Decisions
which would torment the testator if he were free from the influence of
drugs will be far easier to make if the anxiety over their normal conse-
quences can be severed from the decisions themselves, in much the way
that A can solve B's problems much more easily than he can solve his
own.
Other Pain-Relieving Drugs
None of the non-narcotic pain-relievers produce the mental side-
effects of morphine and its relatives; none are as potent, and none seem
to arouse habituation, addiction, or tolerance. The salicylates and anti-
pyretics, of which aspirin is the most common representative, have no
mental side-effects, even when administered in massive doses for the
relief of pain from rheumatic fever and arthritisr 5 Acetanilid and aceto-
phenetidin (Phenacetin) have the same general pain-relieving char-
acteristics as the salicylates. In large doses they have a depressant effect
upon mental activity, but no euphoria is generally associated with their
use.16
Barbiturates and Scopolamine
The barbiturates and scopolamine are used as hypnotics, administered
for the primary purpose of inducing relaxation and sleep. The bar-
, Id. at 1118.
"Hardy, Wolff, Goodell, Pain Sensations and Reactions 354 (1952).
18Id. at 355, 356.
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biturates will relieve pain by putting a patient to sleep, but in non-
soporific doses they possess no specific analgesic properties. Scopolamine
has no pain-relieving properties, but it does cause amnesia in most
patients, and therefore the patient does not remember his pain. Scopol-
amine and the barbiturates possess some powers of magnifying the
effectiveness of narcotic pain-relievers and are frequently administered
with them, but in some persons in pain they also produce mental and
physical disturbances.' 7 As far as the primary mental effect of these
drugs is concerned, if the patient is awake and apparently lucid,
his capacity to think probably is not significantly impaired, though he
will find it harder than usual to concentrate on and retain what he is
told.'8
The barbiturates and scopolamine present a threat from another di-
rection, however: that of undue influence upon a testator's decisions.
These drugs possess as a side-effect the power to increase the suggesti-
bility of some people. 19 Drug-enhanced suggestibility has received a
certain amount of attention from the medical profession. Scopolamine
enjoyed wide notoriety in the early 1930's as a "truth serum"2' 0 but has
been replaced in experimental research by amytal and pentothal, both of
which are barbitura tes and both commonly referred to as their salts, sodi-
um amytal and sodium pentothal.21 The truth-encouraging properties of
the drugs are supposed to result from relaxation of normal anxiety over
the consequences of admitting crimes or embarrassing experiences; but
psychiatrists admit frankly that they have to be careful not to put their
own ideas into the subjects' minds, whence the ideas obligingly reappear
as the subjects' own.
2 2
Other Hypnotics
Chloral hydrate, paraldehyde, and chloretone somewhat resemble the
barbiturates in possessing mild hypnotic properties. They are ad-
ministered to induce sleep. They possess poor analgesic properties, and
there appears to be little if any impairment of the patient's mental
processes, once he is awakened.
2 3
11 GOODMAN AND GILMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42, .141, 145.
"Hardy, Wolff, Goodell, Pain Sensations and Reactions 359 (1952).
" GOODMAN AND GILMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141.
" House, The Use of Scopolamine in Criminology, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL
oF POLICE SCIENCE 528 (1931) ; Lorenz, Criminal Confessions utnder Narcosis,
31 WiscoNsiN MEDICAL JOURNAL 245 (1932). For an exhaustive survey of this
field, see Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 601 (1947).
"Redlich, Ravitz, Dession, Narcoanalysis and Truth, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF PSYCHIATRY 586 (1951).
2 Ibid.
-' GOODMAN AND GILMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 164.
[Vol. 35
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Benzedrine
Amphetamine, known often by its trade name "Benzedrine," is used
chiefly for its stimulating effects upon the mind. In this euphoriant
capacity, it is referred to by its manufacturers as a "mood-ameliorant."
The mental effects of Benzedrine, ranging from sleeplessness to extreme
exhilaration in small doses, have led to its replacement in the familiar
inhaler for nasal congestion by a less euphoriant ingrediant, Dexedrine ;24
but Benzedrine continues to be administered widely by the medical
profession. Far from increasing suggestibility, Benzedrine often arouses




Chlorpromazine (Thorazine), reserpine (Serpasil), and meprobamate
(Miltown, Equanil), which are chemically unrelated drugs with similar
properties, are coming to be called "tranquilizers" or "ataraxics." The
extent of therapeutic and experimental use of these drugs defies descrip-
tion, yet none of them have been available in this country for much
longer than five years.-'
Tranquilizers are widely used to reduce tension, anxiety and fear in
mental patients, and in the treatment of high blood pressure, narcotic
addiction, psychoneuroses, and psychosomatic illnesses generally. The
patient under the influence of tranquilizers is generally conscious, de-
pending upon the drug, the dosage, and his general condition; he may
sleep, but he is easily aroused and is free from tension when awake.
Reserpine28 appears to be capable of producing mental disturbance
29
as well as reducing tension; but chlorpromazine ° tends to make severely
2' Monroe and Drell, Oral Use of Stimulants Obtained from Inhalers, 135
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIAtioN 909 (1947).
"Chapman, Paranoid Psychoses Associated %vith Amphetamine Usage, 111
AmERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 43 (1954).
"Martin, The Therapeutic and Toxic Effects of Tranquilizing Drugs:
Medical Aspects, 17 NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL JOURNAL 396 (1956).
" The tranquilizers present the problem of up-to-the-minute medical research
in acute form. Hardly a month passes without the introduction of another tran-
quilizing preparation, each one with its own trade name. The most complete
bibliographical sources seem to be the brochures distributed by the manufacturers.
For example, a pamphlet published in 1956 by Wallace Laboratories, manufacturers
of Miltown, listed 34 articles in medical journals which have to do with Miltown
and with various other versions of the same drug. These pamphlets are widely
distributed to the medical profession.
" Noce, Williams, Rapaport, Reserpine (Serpasil) in the Management of the
Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded. A Preliminary Report, 153 JOURNAL OF THE
AzmCAN MEDICAL AssoclATloN 821 (1954).
" Schroeder and Perry, Psychoses Apparently Produced by Reserpine, 159
JOURNAL OF THE MEDICAL AsSOCIATION 836 (1955); Muller, Pryor, Gibbons,
Orgain, Depression and Anxiety Occurring during Rauwolfia Therapy, 159
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssociAnloN 839 (1955).
" YOHE, CHLORPROMAZINE AND MENTAL HEALTH (1955) ; Cohen, Undesirable
Effects and Clinical Toxicity of Chlorpromazine, 17 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL AND
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 153 (1956).
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disturbed mental patients more accessible to psychotherapy.
3 ' Mil-
town,3 2 a milder preparation, appears to have no serious mental side-
effects, but it has been on the market for an even shorter time than
other members of the group.
Hallucinogens
Mescaline, peyote, and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) are three
drugs which produce hallucinations and other mental disturbances in
normal persons.3 3 They are currently being used experimentally but
not administered for therapeutic purposes. Reports from behind the
Iron Curtain contain rumors that LSD has been used in order to in-
crease suggestibility, so that persons accused of crimes will confess
more readily.
Anti-Histamines
Common anti-histamines, such as Pyribenzamine, Dramamine, and
Benadryl, have mental effects upon certain individuals, depending upon
the dosage, the length of time the drugs have been administered, and
the purpose of the administration. 'Mental side-effects of the different
anti-histamines vary widely, but most persons find the befuddling side-
effects of anti-histamines unpleasant but not severe in moderate doses.84
Cortisone and Related Drugs
Medical science is currently exploring a real danger to mental sta-
bility from the use of certain hormones, notably cortisone and cortico-
tropin (ACTH), which have been used principally in treating arthritis
but which are now being tried experimentally in a constantly expanding
number of disease conditions-even in the treatment of mental disease.85
The degree of-psychotic effect varies with the prior mental state of the
patient, his age and general physical condition, the size and duration
of dosage, and probably in regard to other yet unidentified factors.30
These side-effects seem to disappear when the drug is discontinued.
The psychoses apparently produced by ACTH and cortisone are typically
3 Bennett, Ford, Turk, Clinical Investigation of Chlorpromazine and Reserpine
in Private Psychiatric Practice, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYcHIATRY 782
(1956).
" Selling, Clinical Study of a New Tranquilizing Drug, 157 JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL. AssoCiATIOx 1594 (1955); Borrus, Study of Effect of
Miltown . . . on Psychiatric States, 157 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
AssoClAION 1596 (1955).
" Rinkel, Hyde, Solomon, Hallucinogens: Tools in Experimental Psychiatry,
16 DISEAsEs OF THE NERvous SysTEm 229 (1955); Hoch, Experimentally Pro-
duced Psychoses, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCIATRY 607 (1951).
8' GOODMAN AND GILMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 658, 662.
2 2Lindeman and Clarke, Modification in Ego Structure and Personality Re-
actions under the Influence of the Effects of Drugs, 108 AmERICAN JOURNAL OF
PSYCHIATRY 561 (1952).
" Quarton, Clark, Cobb, Bauer, Mental Disturbances Associated with ACTH
and Cortisone: A Review of Explanatory Hypotheses, 34 MEDICINE 13 (1955).
Vol. 35
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The medical term used to describe wide variations in the response
of individuals to drugs is "idiosyncrasy. '38 For example, a person who
responds with continued vomiting to the administration of morphine
demonstrates an idiosyncrasy-an unusually severe manifestation of a
common side-effect; or at the other extreme, a patient might exhibit
no mental reaction whatever to a substantial dosage of morphine.
Idiosyncrasy is mentioned here rather than earlier in order to stress
the importance of individual reactions to drugs. What has gone before
has been pharmacological, describing typical or average reactions to
drugs; but what follows is in the medical sense clinical-the observed
reaction of a particular patient. In determining typical reactions, the
textbook writer necessarily disregards extremes on both sides, but drugs
are notoriously capable of producing atypical reactions in individuals.
Medically and legally, the only clearly indicated procedure in examining
a patient for testamentary capacity is the most painstaking investigation
of the patient himself, in the light of whatever forewarning this medical
background can provide.
III
MENTAL SIDE-EFFECTS AND TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Although each jurisdiction has its own definition of testamentary
capacity, the definitions do not differ widely from one another analyti-
cally; and since there are no clearly distinguishable majority and minority
views, it is convenient to turn to the text-writers for foundation defini-
tions.
Atkinson lists five elements of testamentary capacity in his treatise.39
The testator must understand and carry in his mind in a general way:
(1) The nature and extent of his property,
(2) The persons who are the natural objects of his bounty, and
(3) The disposition which he is making of his property.
He must also be capable of:
(4) Appreciating those elements in relation to each other, and
(5) Forming an orderly desire as to the disposition of his prop-
erty.
40
" Clark, Quarton, Cobb, Bauer, Further Observations on Mental Disturbances
Associated with Cortisone and ACTH Therapy, 249 Naw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF
MEDICINE 178 (1953).
'8 GOODMAN AND GILMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12.
AATiNso, WILLs § 51 (2d ed. 1953).
,0Ibid.
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Atkinson also points out two corollaries: first, a testator ". . . need not
possess superior or even average mentality"; second, ". . . one may have
testamentary capacity though he is under guardianship or lacks the
ability to make a contract or transact other business."
41
Undue influence was also alleged in over half of the cases in which
testamentary capacity was attacked because of drug induced mental
impairment, and therefore its inclusion at this point seems justified.
42
Undue influence is an important part of the logic of attacking a will. The
caveators assert that the testator did not have the mental capacity to
make a will; and yet the propounders have put forward a writing for
probate. If the testator could not have made a will, then someone
else must have implanted the wishes represented as the testator's; and
the substitution of someone else's wishes is considered to be a form
of undue influence. When the testator's will-power is weakened, it is
likely to be overridden; when it disappears, it is likely to be replaced.
It would thus be unrealistic to consider testamentary capacity apart from
undue influence, especially in the light of the ability of some drugs to
weaken the power to resist unwanted suggestions.
The legal standard of mental capacity required to make a will is far
from severe. "The standard of testamentary capacity has been properly
fixed at a very low point in the scale of intelligence .... -43 The courts
have gone far to uphold wills in spite of illness and drug effects which
give rise to serious doubt, especially where there was collateral evi-
dence that the testator was really expressing his own wishes-for ex-
ample, where the will under attack resembled prior wills, 44 or where
there was evidence of sensible business activity at the same period
during which the will was made,45 or where there was good eyewitness
testimony in favor of capacity either by persons well acqainted with the
testator or by attending medical experts.
46
The cases, decided as they are on their individual facts, do not lend
themselves to deep legal analysis. Several cases cited not one other
case to the factual point at issue,47 and in general there is no thread of
leading cases which may be pursued in studying the development of law
in this field.
"'Ibid. In North Carolina and several other states, however, guardianship
raises a presumption against testamentary capacity. See Sutton v. Sutton, 222
N. C. 274, 22 S. E. 2d 553 (1942) and cases cited. See also Note, Effect of
Competency Adjudication in Subsequent Will Contest, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 329
(1951).
'2 See Green, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency; A Study in
Related Cowepts, 43 CoLum. L. Rav. 176 (1943).
"Executors of Moore v. Blauvelt, 15 N. J. Eq. 367, 384 (1862).
" Miller v. Oestrich, 157 Pa. 264, 27 Atl. 742 (1893).
" Cude v. Culberson, 30 Tenn. App. 628, 209 S. W. 2d 506 (1947).
" In re King's Will, 251 Wis. 269, 29 N. W. 2d 69 (1947) ; Blake v. Rourke,
74 Iowa 519, 38 N. W. 392 (1888).
' E.g., Dieffenbach v. Grece, 56 N. J. Eq. 365, 39 Atl. 536 (1898).
[Vol. 35
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Indeed, the law has shown little development since 1855.48 A testator
on his deathbed from typhoid, "stimulated" as the doctor thought by
doses of laudanum and brandy,49 was roused with difficulty from his
stupor by the attorney, who tested his capacity by asking how long he
had been sick. The testator answered correctly, "Four weeks Friday."
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia is as pertinent today as it
was a hundred years ago:
"Though very ill-though in. a sinking and dying condition,
yet, it appears to us that what time his attention was aroused and
given to the purpose of making his will, his mind acted definitely,
and with discriminating judgment." 50
Every reported contest must be read with an eye to the size of the
estate being contested. Where money is the object, counsel will spare
a large estate no expense in giving the court all the evidence available
on both sides of the issue of testamentary capacity. Conversely, small
estates produce skimpy evidence, and the medical evidence noted in
appellate opinions is likely to have been inadequately presented to and
poorly understood by the court of first instance.
The Presumption in Favor of Testamentary Capacity
"In a will contest case, where due execution and attestation
are established, a presumption of testamentary capacity arises, and
the burden of proving unsoundness of mind of the testator is upon
the contestant."51
What sort of evidence must the contestants introduce in order to rebut
this presumption?
Where a testator has been under medical administration of drugs
for a comparatively short time, and where there is no claim of mental
derangement of a continuous nature, successful contestants must show
that at the time the will was executed, the testator had not sufficient
inental capacity to make it:
".... [I]n the instant case the mental incapacity is claimed to
be due to temporary causes, i.e., paroxysms of pain and the ad-
ministration of opiates. The burden being on the contestant to
show mental incapacity .... it is incumbent upon him to show
8 Hall v. Hall, 18 Ga. 40 (1855).
" Laudanum is an alcoholic solution of opium, and both alcohol and opium are
depressants, not stimulants.
'0 Hall v. Hall, 18 Ga. 40, 46 (1855).
"'lit re Holmes' Estate, 270 P. 2d 320, 322 (Okla. 1954) [arteriosclerosis,
uremia; morphine]. Beginning at this point, a brief note giving the disease of
the testator and the drug administered will follow the citation, in brackets.
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that the temporary causes are operating at the time the will is
made.
52
The courts have set rather short time intervals which are at least
open to question: "Testator's suffering required the administration of
an opiate at times, but none was administered the day he executed the
will."m The implication that an opiate-free morning or afternoon as-
sures testamentary capacity is not free from doubt, if it is assumed that
testator was not competent in the preceding period:
"The testimony shows that in the morning and fore part of the
day [testator] was usually free from pain, and the effect of the
drug administered in the evening and night having passed away,
he was in better condition than at any other time during the
twenty-four hours.54  [The will was executed in the morning.]
This decision is questionable, in view of medical statements that the
psychological effects of morphine outlast the analgesic action by many
hours. 55
Another case makes the same assumption, this time in regard to
barbiturates:
"Though drugs were administered to the testator intermit-
tently to produce sleep and rest, the record is without contradic-
tion that no drugs of any kind were administered during the en-
tire afternoon of March 12, 1945, the date the will was executed.r0
The cases mentioned thus far were instances where witnesses could be
found to testify that before or after the will was drawn, the testator
lacked mental capacity. In protracted illness, it may be said that a
testator is at one time capable of executing a will, eventually becomes
consistently incapable, and in the meantime may swing back and forth
between these extremes.
One case deals neatly with a situation where the testator was clearly
capable at one point and rapidly became incapable, passing in a few
hours through a single questionable period, during which the will was
executed, into coma. This 67-year old farmer, who caught his arm in
2 n re Cochrane's Estate, 211 Mich. 370, 375, 178 N. W. 673, 674 (1920)
[cancer; morphine].
"In re Estate of Burwitz, 272 Mich. 16, 17, 261 N. W. 121, 122 (1935)
[cancer; "opiate"]; see also In re Glockner's Will, 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 798, 2 N. Y.
Supp. 97 (Surr. Ct. 1888) [cancer: opium].
" Epling v. Hutton, 121 Ill. 555, 559, 13 N.E. 242, 244 (1887) [vascular oc-
clusions in the leg; morphine].
"Wolff, Hardy, Goodell, Studies in Pain, 19 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL INVESTIGA-
"nON 659, 664 (1940).
" In re Llewellyn's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 534, 565, 189 P. 2d 822, 840
(1948) [cirrhosis of liver, ulcer in rectum, gallstones; seconal, nembutal, pheno-
barbital].
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a hay baler and died the following day, received a total of 10 mg. of
morphine sulphate and 100 mg. of Demerol; his will was executed three
hours after the accident and following the heavy dosage of Demerol, a
drug which resembles morphine. The raised level of reflex excitability
caused by great pain should be considered in evaluating the probable
effect of the drugs. The court said:
"In view of the fact that all of the witnesses at the execution
of the will and prior thereto testified to testator's competency, to-
gether with the fact that he was suffering from irreversible shock,
and getting progressively worse due to his injury, there is no
logical relation between the fact that he was later in a stupor or
unconscious, and the issue of mental capacity at the time of the
making of the will."
7
It has long been held that illness does not in itself prevent a testator
from having testamentary capacity. The statement of a Louisiana notary
in witnessing a will, paraphrasing a familiar saying, makes the point
clearly:
"Personally came and appeared Dreux AXngers, a single man of
lawful age, residing in the Parish of Terrebonne, State of Louisi-
ana, ill in body, but of sound and disposing mind, as he appeared
to the said named five witnesses and me, Notary .... ,,58
By the same token, the fact that a testator has been given narcotic
drugs is not conclusive evidence that he is so much under their influ-
ence as to be incapable of making a will.
"If .. . a physician prescribes a sedative or some medicine
to ease pain or reduce nervousness, the fact that such a drug has
been administered is not, of itself, proof or even weighty evidence
of testamentary incapacity." 59
"The ministration of narcotics was but one of the evidentiary
facts of the whole case. . .."Go
"Main reliance is had on the fact that within forty-six hours
of the time the proposed will was executed testator had fourteen
administrations of opiates for rest and to deaden his constant
pain, two of which were within three hours of the time the will
"lin re Walters' Estate, 77 Ariz. 122, 126, 267 P. 2d 896, 899 (1954) [accident;
morphine, Demerol]. Remanded with direction to admit to probate."8 Succession of Angers, 205 La. 190, 194, 17 So. 2d 247, 248 (1944) [cancer
of prostate; amytal, phenobarbital, codeine, morphine]. Quotation by and em-
phasis supplied by the court.
" In re Kinssies' Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 723, 734, 214 P. 2d 693, 699 (1950)
[heart attack; pantopon].
" In re Mikelson's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 97, 99, 247 P. 2d 540, 541 (1952)
[heart attack; morphine] ; see also Nunn v. Williams, 254 S. W. 2d 698 (Ky. 1953)
[abdominal cancer; Demerol].
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was executed. The record in the hospital shows they were the
usual and average dosages of drugs, such as demerol and
pantopon, at three to four hour intervals during testator's waking
hours. The testimony of the witnesses who had an opportunity
to observe him is that at the time the will was prepared and exe-
cuted he was in sound mind, alert, knew what he wanted, and had
full testamentary capacity. While it is conceded that opiates
have some effect on the alertness and judgment of persons to
whom they are administered, this effect varies widely in indi-
viduals, particularly in relation to the amount of drugs to which
they are accustomed. The evidence clearly sustains the trial
court on the question of mental capacity."' 1
Pain, drugs, advanced age, blindness, and kindred physical impair-
ments may be used as evidence tending to show lack of testamentary
capacity, but the courts recognize that the choice is between the will,
which probably contains at least some of the testator's wishes, and the
distribution prescribed by the law of intestate succession, which by the
very fact of the contest will bestow some of his property to persons he
considered positively undeserving. Faced with this choice, the courts
understandably find for the will unless the evidence strongly points
toward incapacity or undue influence.
The Presumption on the Other Foot
2
There are a few cases demonstrating a presumption contrary to the
basic presumption that a testator had testamentary capacity. ".
[W]hen settled and general unsoundness of mind is proved, a pre-
sumption arises in favor of its continued existence." 3 In a more recent
case, the court framed the principle thus:
"In determining testamentary capacity, the mental condition of
the testator at the very time of executing the will is the only
point of inquiry; but ... evidence of the testator's condition at a
time other than the date of the execution of the will may shift
the burden of proof and require the production of affirmative
proof of his condition at the very time the will was executed."
0 14
Transferring and applying this principle to therapeutically admin-
istered drugs should present no serious problem. In one case, the
testator was virtually unconscious from disease and large quantities of
"1 Will of King, 251 Wis. 269, 274, 29 N. W. 2d 69, 71 (1947) [heart condi-
tion; Demerol and pantopon].
62 See also n. 41, supra.
Kirsher vi Kirsher, 120 Iowa 337, 341, 94 N. W. 846, 847 (1903) [stroke,
senility; no drug stated].
", American Trust & Banking Co. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App. 592, 603, 225
S. W. 2d 79, 84 (1948) [cirrhosis of liver; no drug stated].
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narcotics; the court strongly implied that undue influence was pres-
ent.6r In another case, beneficiaries under the proposed will failed to
obtain proper execution at one time and tried again a week later. Mean-
while, the testator's rascally brother, a doctor who had once been in-
stitutionalized for drug addiction, kept the testator under the influence
of heavy overdoses of morphine. Undue influence was the principal
issue; there was testimony that the testator was almost unconscious
when the will was executed. Said the court, "He was then and had
been for some days heavily dosed with morphine and other like drugs...
Certainly at that time the testator did not have the mental capacity
to make a will."'00
The fact that a testator was ill and had been given mind-affecting
drugs can be introduced as evidence to indicate his mental condition
at the time the will was executed. Hence, the presumption of continuing
incapacity would appear to be a valuable line of attack upon the wills
of testators in terminal illnesses, when it is discovered by contestants
that there had been a course of administration of drugs extending for
some days. The attack, if successful, would force proponents of the
will to show that it was executed during a period analogous to a lucid
interval in contests tased upon alleged insanity.
Strong-Willed Testators and Undue Influence
The courts are willing to find that a particular testator had the
capacity to make a will in spite of the mental side-effects of the drugs
administered. ". . . [U]nless the theory that [mental unsoundness]
ought to exist, or might exist, be followed by proof that it actually did
exist at the important moment, the theoretical proof is of no practical
value in the contention." 7
It has been recognized that morphine given over a period of time
might ". . .weaken... power of resistance to importunity of others .... ,,68
-the fear of undue influence appearing once more as the companion of
mental incapacity. However, one court used the fact that a testatrix
was dressed and able to walk to a table to sign the will as evidence that
she was in no way under a drug's influence, and presumably that there-
fore she was under no undue influence from other persons. 9 Another
court said,
"lit re Skrtic's Estate, 379 Pa. 95, 108 A. 2d 750 (1954) [cancer; narcotics];
see also Garrison v. Blanton, 48 Tex. 299 (1877) [no disease stated; morphine].
Probate denied in both cases.
"In re Estate of Lande, 183 Minn. 419, 422, 236 N. W. 705, 706 (1931) [can-
cer; morphine].
"Miller v. Oestrich, 157 Pa. 264, 273, 27 AtI. 742, 745 (1893) [rheumatism;
morphine].
"Dieffenbach v. Grece, 56 N. J. Eq. 365, 370, 39 Atl. 536, 538 (1898) [can-
cer; morphine].
"It re Glockner's Will, 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 798, 2 N. Y. Supp. 97 (Surr. Ct.
1888) [cancer; opium].
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".... [I]nstead of being passive in the face of suggestions concern-
ing his affairs the testator vigorously resisted any interference,
and time and time again he declared and avowed his intention to
dispose of his property as he himself saw fit."7°
Cases like these provide the foundation for efforts to prevent con-
tests, when the attorney can show that whatever the generalities of the
situation, his witnesses are prepared to testify that this testator when
he executed his will met the legal standard of testamentary capacity and
was not under the improper influence of anyone.
Preventive Techniques
Having now posed the threat to testamentary capacity from thera-
peutic drugs, it behooves the discussion to provide some advice for
meeting the threat.
In the typical situation, there is considerable doubt that the patient
will recover from his illness, and there is no certain prospect that a
moment better than the present will arise for the execution of his will.
Perhaps the attending physician can temporarily modify his treatment in
order to improve the patient's mental capacity. If so, this will justify
a brief postponement in executing the will, but not one of more than a
day or so. Even if the prognosis is fairly favorable, it is preferable to
have a rudimentary will now, just in case, and plan to do a better job
when the patient recovers.
The need for contemporaneous precautions is magnified when there
is some likelihood that any will executed at this time will be con-
tested later on. It is true that as a matter of practice, every will ought
to be drawn with a view toward making it strong against attack; but
with the hazard of impaired mental capacity in the picture, special pre-
cautions are called for, especially when the will disposes of the testator's
property in a manner likely to provoke a contest.
Looking ahead to defending a will against caveators, the attorney will
need witnesses-preferably experts in medicine and in the observation
of mental condition. The best time to get these witnesses is at the time
the will is executed; and the best place to record their presence is at the
foot of the will, as attesting witnesses. Not only does this add weight
to the usual layman's attestation that the testator was of sound mind and
memory, but it also serves to commit the putative caveators' best avail-
able witnesses-the attending physicians and nurses-to the defense of
the will.71 Properly informed of the standard of mental capacity re-
quired to make a valid will, and convinced as scientifically-oriented per-
"It re Llewellyn's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 534, 564, 189 P. 2d 822, 840
(1948) [cirrhosis of liver, ulcer in rectum, gallstones; seconal, nembutal, pheno-
barbital].
"' See ATKiNsoN, WILLS § 74 (2d ed. 1953).
[Vol. 35
MEDICATION AS A THREAT
sons that the testator possessed the required capacity, physicians and
nurses will make credible witnesses who -will be unlikely to change their
minds under cross-examination.
Psychiatric Assistance
If the attorney has some doubt as to whether his client has sufficient
mental capacity to make a will, one obvious solution to the problem is to
call for a psychiatric examination.72  There are two practical obstacles
to overcome: finding the time and a psychiatrist to make the examina-
tion, and persuading the testator to submit to the examination, which
he may consider neither pleasant nor flattering. Nevertheless, it seems
that an affirmative finding by a reputable psychiatrist, based upon ob-
servation contemporary with execution of the will, would be worth far
more than the same psychiatrist's answer to the best imaginable hypo-
thetical question, months later in court. Before he calls in a psychiatrist,
the attorney has to weigh two risks: the so-called double-edged sword
argument, which asserts that calling in the psychiatrist in itself invites
attention to doubt in the attorney's mind ;73 and the likelihood that the
psychiatrist might find against testamentary capacity, even when care-
fully informed of the standard of mental capacity involved.
In support of psychiatric examination before the will is drawn, there
is a case which clearly supports the careful preventive medico-legal work
of a foresighted attorney: In re Bottger's Estate,74 which is apposite in
every detail save one, that it deals not with the mental side-effects of
drugs but with a patient whose mental processes were impaired by arteri-
osclerosis.
Mrs. Bottger was 93 years old. Her attorney had sound reason to
believe that guardianship proceedings would soon be initiated when he
drew the will, and so at his behest, she submitted to two mental exam-
inations, six weeks apart. Mrs. Bottger left ten dollars to each of the
contestants, who were five of her seven surviving children, and the
residue to her son Harry. Contestants petitioned to have the will de-
clared void and secured a decree revoking probate.
The Supreme Court of Washington in its opinion described in detail
the steps taken by the examining physicians, Dr. Austin J. O'Leary and
Dr. Marjorie Heitman, who, "... . having satisfied themselves as to her
competency, signed her will as witnesses, ' '17 and later testified to the
72 See Note, Psychiatric Assistance in the Determination of Testamentary Ca-
pacity, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1116 (1953).
*' See ATxINSON. WILLS §§ 51, 74 (2d ed. 1953).
7' 14 Wash. 2d 676, 129 P. 2d 518 (1942) [arteriosclerosis; no medication speci-
fled]. For a comparable but somewhat weaker case, see Bollinger v. Arkansas
Valley Trust Co., 202 Ark. 525, 151 S. W. 2d 675 (1941).
"Id. at 695, 129 P. 2d at 526. The American Medical Directory 1903 (17th
ed. 1942) lists Dr. O'Leary as a physician who limited his practice to psychiatry
and neuro-surgery; Dr. Heitman had training in obstetrics and gynecology.
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same effect. Said the court:
"The testimony of Dr. O'Leary and Dr. Heitman is entitled
to great weight, since they were, at the same time, attending
physicians and subscribing witnesses...
"In this connection, respondents contend that the fact that
physicians were called to examine the testatrix indicates that the
parties concerned were suspicious of her testamentary capacity.
However, we think this was a wise course to pursue, in view of
the age of the testatrix, the nature of the will, and the fact that
there was reason to believe that guardianship proceedings would
be instituted in the near future, and possibly a will contest later." 76
The supreme court reversed the court below and directed that the will
contest proceedings be dismissed.
IV
CONCLUSION
Three matters of practice remain to conclude the discussion.
First, as a matter of medical practice, can the physician temporarily
modify the course of medication with a view to improving a patient's
mental capacity? It is the province neither of the attorney nor of this
discussion to tell the physician how to perform his tasks, but there seems
to be no harm in asking, bearing in mind that the particular answer is
always up to the attending physician. In asking, the attorney ought to
spell out to the physician the low standard of mental capacity required,
so that the physician can see how a slight improvement may represent
the difference between a will and no will.
Second, there is a distinct legal possibilty that the attorney can match
the will to the testator's capacity to make it. Suppose that an attorney
has time to prepare a detailed, complex will appropriate to his client's
circumstances, but he is not certain that the client has the mental capacity
to understand the manner in which the will embodies his wishes.
Assuming in this situation that a simple will is preferable to in-
testacy, it is suggested that the attorney prepare a simple will which
briefly states the testator's wishes-a synopsis or sketch. Since the
capacity to make a will is measured by the courts against a particular
will at a particular time, there seems to be no reason to suppose that a
court would reject a simple will for the sole reason that the testator ap-
peared to have been incapable of executing a complex will.
Finally, does an attorney, as an officer of the court, have a duty to
refrain from drawing a will when he has some doubt that the testator has
76 Id. at 696, 129 P. 2d at 526.
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sufficient mental capacity to execute it? If the doubt is no more than
a doubt, it is suggested that the attorney take the position that he is an
advocate whose duty is the care of his client's interests, not the pre-
judging of possible disputes arising after his client's death. If the
attorney should refuse to draw his client's will, the chances are that some
other attorney can be found to draw it, leaving the client with what in
all probability will be a poorer instrument, more vulnerable to attack
and less useful if probated.
If he does draw the will, the attorney should refrain from signing
it as an attesting witness, because if the will should be contested, he
probably should not appear in its favor and 'also represent the pro-
pounders in court.77 In balance, it would seem that when the client's
interests stand to gain so much by having the regular attorney draw
the will, the regular attorney ought to construe every doubt in favor
of doing his best and leave the outcome to the future. In this way, the
attorney can make his contribution to the client's peace of mind, to take
its place with the ministrations of the medical profession.
7"American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics § 19 (1955 ed.).
If an attorney is an attesting witness, he can be called by the caveators; he does
not have' the benefit of the attorney-client privilege; and his testimony is ad-
missible. 8 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2315 (3d ed. 1940).
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